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Abstract—Over the past five years, the rewards associated with
mining Proof-of-Work blockchains have increased substantially.
As a result, miners are heavily incentivized to design and
utilize Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) that can
compute hashes far more efficiently than existing general purpose
hardware. Currently, it is difficult for most users to purchase
and operate ASICs due to pricing and availability constraints,
resulting in a relatively small number of miners with respect
to total user base for most popular cryptocurrencies. In this
work, we aim to invert the problem of ASIC development by
constructing a Proof-of-Work function for which an existing
general purpose processor (GPP, such as an x86 IC) is already
an optimized ASIC. In doing so, we will ensure that any would-be
miner either already owns an ASIC for the Proof-of-Work system
they wish to participate in or can attain one at a competitive
price with relative ease. In order to achieve this, we present
HashCore, a Proof-of-Work function composed of “widgets”
generated pseudo-randomly at runtime that each execute a
sequence of general purpose processor instructions designed to
stress the computational resources of such a GPP. The widgets
will be modeled after workloads that GPPs have been optimized
for, for example, the SPEC CPU 2017 benchmark suite for x86
ICs, in a technique we refer to as inverted benchmarking. We
provide a proof that HashCore is collision-resistant regardless
of how the widgets are implemented. We observe that GPP
designers/developers essentially create an ASIC for benchmarks
such as SPEC CPU 2017. By modeling HashCore after such
benchmarks, we create a Proof-of-Work function that can be
run most efficiently on a GPP, resulting in a more accessible,
competitive, and balanced mining market.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Proof-of-Work, Mining, Security,
Cryptography, Collision-Resistant Hash Function
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Proof-of-Work protocols have grown in pop-
ularity in large part due to their application in cryptocurrencies
such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. While decentralized cryptocur-
rencies exist in many varieties, one common feature is the
use of a blockchain as a tamper-evident distributed ledger.
In order to discourage malicious actors from attempting to
overwrite the ledger, many cryptocurrencies employ a Proof-
of-Work (PoW) protocol, defined first in [3] and formalized
in [6].
In the context of blockchains, PoW protocols simply require
that the header for each block can be passed through a hash
function such that the resulting hash meets some statistically
unlikely structural requirement, such as some number of lead-
ing zeros in its binary representation. We call a hash meeting
this requirement a “proof of work” because we know with high
probability that sufficient computational “work” must have
been performed to find this hash. This ensures that on average,
the cost of overwriting blocks (“pages” in the ledger) will be
comparable to the cost of initially writing those blocks. As
most PoW systems vary the difficulty of the PoW protocol
with the total hashing power of the network, we have the
important property that an increase in hashing power results
in an increased cost of attacking the network. The process
of searching for hashes is referred to as “mining,” and there
is generally a significant reward associated with successfully
mining a block.
Given the competitive nature of mining, each miner is
heavily incentivized to increase the efficiency with which
they can compute hashes. A common strategy is to develop
or purchase custom hardware in the form of an Application
Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) that can efficiently execute
the hash function used by the PoW protocol. ASICs are
generally much more cost efficient than generalized hardware
and are currently the best way to profitably mine most popular
cryptocurrencies. This is acceptable for a PoW system so long
as such ASICs are widely accessible to a large number of
users for roughly the same price. Unfortunately, this is not the
case, as ASIC development is a highly expensive and time-
investive process. Thus, access to an ASIC is restricted to
those that can afford them. For this reason, cryptocurrency
mining has tended toward centralization in the recent past, with
the total hashing power of the network being controlled by a
few large mining operations rather than being diffused across
the much larger user base as would be desirable in a truly
decentralized system. Our proposed solution to this problem
is to develop a new PoW function for which the average user
already owns an optimized-ASIC, thereby reducing the barrier
to entering the mining market and increasing the availability
of such optimized ASICs to any user.
In previous work, the most common approach for designing
a PoW function that cannot be optimized through custom
hardware has been targeting a speed-limiting computational
resource which cannot be made significantly more efficient
with an ASIC [1], [2], [9]. For example, many memory-bound
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hash functions have been implemented as PoW functions
under the assumption that the price of memory units is
roughly constant between custom and generalized hardware.
Unfortunately, ASICs can still achieve modest performance
gains because the energy required to power memory units in
an ASIC is much lower than that of generalized hardware
[10]. Additionally, because general purpose processors (GPPs)
require significantly greater computational resources compared
to the implementation of a specific function, any PoW function
that utilizes only a subset of the resources within a GPP is
vulnerable to an ASIC that mimics the GPP with respect to
that subset and strips away everything else. Thus, we desire
a PoW function for which a given GPP is optimal in die-
area, resource allocation, and associated functionality, i.e., it
stresses every computational resource in proportion with its
importance within the GPP. If this is achievable, then any
customized ASIC for such a PoW function would mimic the
GPP, thus achieving our goal.
The goal of this work is to design a PoW function (which
could also be called a “hash” function) that is most efficiently
computed by a GPP such that no ASIC can be built for it
that materially outperforms such a GPP. Stated another way,
we assume that the GPP is a perfectly-optimized ASIC for
an unknown set of programs. If a PoW function exists that
requires execution of a wide ranging set of these unknown
programs, then the GPP is an optimized-ASIC for that PoW
function. From this viewpoint, we have essentially reversed
the ASIC development thought process, which involves de-
veloping a custom chip that can execute a particular PoW
function with high efficiency. In this work, we instead aim
to develop a PoW function that can be executed on a GPP
with optimal or near-optimal efficiency, resulting in a PoW
system for which GPPs are the optimized ASIC. We refer to
this technique as inverted benchmarking; instead of designing
hardware that can most efficiently execute a particular set of
programs, we are designing a set of programs that can be most
efficiently executed on a particular piece of hardware.
HashCore is a PoW function that satisfies the goal of
inverted benchmarking, with an x86 processor serving as the
working example. Note that we will henceforth use the term
“PoW function” rather than “hash function” in this document,
as this function is designed primarily to enable PoW and is
not a conventional cryptographic hash function such as those
in the SHA2 family. All other hashing and other functionality
within the blockchain will remain the unchanged, with only
the PoW function being replaced by HashCore.
At a high level, HashCore will consist of a sequence of code
blocks called widgets that each stress one or more computa-
tional resources within the GPP. However, simply stressing
each resource is not sufficient, as there is no guarantee that a
program that arbitrarily stresses the computational structures
in a chip cannot be executed more efficiently on another
chip architecture. In particular, HashCore must near-optimally
stress each resource so that no significant greater optimization
is possible. With HashCore, we take advantage of existing
work in x86 CPU optimization by modeling our widgets
after benchmarks that all x86 chips are optimized against,
most notably the SPEC CPU 2017 benchmark suite. In this
way, HashCore can leverage the research and development
performed by all x86 chip designers.
We reason that, as x86 chip manufacturers specifically
design their hardware to execute such benchmarks efficiently,
x86 processors are essentially near-optimal ASICs for such
benchmarks1. As such, each of the computational structures
present on x86 chips are there because they improve perfor-
mance on SPEC CPU 2017 in some way. By designing widgets
that emulate SPEC CPU 2017 workloads, we transitively
ensure that x86 chips are near-optimal ASICs for HashCore.
By a similar argument, if a chip is designed that consistently
and significantly outperforms an x86 on HashCore, this chip
should also significantly outperform an x86 on the SPEC CPU
2017 benchmark suite. Such a chip would be difficult to design
since the costs associated with designing x86 CPUs are gen-
erally much higher than ASICs for a particular PoW function.
Not only would this newly designed ASIC be expensive, it
would also be, by definition, a GPP capable of running a wide
variety of x86 programs. If such a chip were indeed designed,
it would quickly replace existing x86 chips in the GPP market
and be used for many more applications than just mining.
Note that, for ease of discussion and analysis, we speak
of all x86 chips as if they share a single architecture. We
reason that if there is some subset of x86 chips that are most
performant on HashCore, then one or more of these chips will
be readily available to the average user. We also believe that
the performance gap will be small enough that there will exist
a broad set of x86 chips that are competitive in the mining
market, though we leave confirmation of this to future work.
II. RELATED WORK
“ASIC resistance” has often been a desired goal for PoW
functions in recent literature. Generally, a PoW function could
be said to be ASIC resistant if significant performance gains
could not be realized with custom hardware. We have yet to
see a formal definition of ASIC resistance, however, so we
refer the reader to [10] and citations within for a more detailed
description.
Hash functions such as Equihash [1], Balloon [2], and scrypt
[9] all attempt to achieve ASIC resistance through memory-
hardness. A memory-hard function is one that requires a
large amount of memory to be executed efficiently, commonly
requiring the traversal of a very large (potentially multiple
gigabytes) graph. This property is desirable because upfront
memory costs are roughly fixed between custom and general
hardware, so higher memory requirements will reduce the
price disparity between custom and general hardware in terms
of hash rate per dollar spent. Unfortunately, this strategy does
not take into account the cost of electricity to power the chip,
which represents a large portion of operating expenses for
1Note the emphasis on near-optimal. Even though there may be no opti-
mality guarantee for such benchmarks, if no significant further optimization
is possible, then using a custom ASIC over the GPP is rendered economically
unviable.
miners. Ren et al. propose bandwidth-hard functions [10] in
order to reduce the energy advantage of ASICs, though this
still allows ASICs that consist only of many memory units and
graph traversal logic units to achieve efficiency gains over a
general purpose machine.
We approach the problem similarly in this work, though
rather than targeting a single computational resource to be
stressed, we target every computational resource on a chip.
In other words, rather than attempting to design an ASIC
resistant PoW function, we instead seek to design a PoW
function for which a highly-optimized ASIC, such as an x86
processor, already exists and is widely available to consumers.
This approach makes sense in the context of PoW systems
for a variety of reasons, which will be discussed later, but it
also allows us to take advantage of the considerable amount
of research done towards optimizing general purpose CPUs.
Specifically, we assume that any general purpose CPU is
intended to be an ASIC for the benchmark suites against which
it is optimized. SPEC CPU 2017 is currently the primary
benchmark suite against which x86 chips are optimized and
is thus our focus in this work. SPEC CPU 2017 consists of
43 benchmarks that are drawn from end-user applications.
Unfortunately, executing SPEC CPU 2017 in its entirety takes
several hours for even the most performant CPUs, meaning
HashCore can hope, at best, to simulate a small fraction of the
actual workload during each hash computation. We overcome
this problem by pseudo-randomly generating widgets that
mimic the execution profile of SPEC CPU 2017.
III. MOTIVATION
In this paper we encourage a perspective shift in the devel-
opment of PoW functions with respect to ASIC resistance, as
there is nothing inherently evil about ASICs. On the contrary,
optimized ASICs should be used by all miners, which is
only possible if they are broadly available to many users
for roughly the same price. This is because the security of
a PoW system depends on the property that computing a
hash (a single execution of the PoW function) has roughly
the same cost for all miners. Without this property, those
miners who could compute hashes at lower cost would have
a disproportionate advantage over the rest of the network and
would therefore be able to write blocks at lower average cost
than the remaining miners. This is clearly undesirable, as a
“perfectly” decentralized blockchain would not favor some set
of miners over another. Then in an ideal PoW system, all
miners would have equal access to the most efficient ASICs
available at the same price. From this viewpoint, the desired
invariant is not necessarily to resist the development of ASICs
but rather to grant all miners equal opportunity to acquire
and operate comparable, competitively efficient computational
hardware. This opportunity is currently gated by the high costs
and development times for near-optimal ASICs for a given
PoW function. To this end, we develop HashCore, aimed to
be a PoW function for which a GPP is already a near-optimal
ASIC.
There are many potential benefits to targeting GPPs as
desired ASICs for a particular PoW function. Most notably,
many individuals already own at least one GPP, meaning any
would-be miner would not have to incur a significant upfront
cost to enter the mining market. This would enable low-capital
users to mine in a PoW system without disenfranchising larger
miners, who can still purchase large quantities of GPPs and
mine at a scale proportional to their means.
We also observe that once a PoW function is determined
to be effectively reducible to an ASIC, entities that are able
to quickly develop and produce efficient ASICs may set
prices significantly above the competitive equilibrium. These
market inefficiencies manifest as additional costs on some
miners (those who are not the developers), resulting in higher
entry costs into the mining market until the market stabilizes.
However, as the GPP market is already highly competitive,
there is far less potential for short-term pricing markups on
GPPs. By targeting GPPs as the desired ASICs for HashCore,
we can leverage a mature and efficient market for ASICs
without these intermediate inefficiencies.
Additionally, there is far less risk associated with investing
in GPPs for cryptocurrency mining. Specialized ASICs, such
as those used for Bitcoin, have very little use outside of
mining. This means that during periods in which mining is
less profitable, miners with specialized hardware may have
to choose between mining at a potential loss or letting their
machines sit idle. This would not be the case if general purpose
hardware could be used to mine efficiently, as it by definition
has value outside of its use in mining. Instead of sitting idle,
mining hardware could be repurposed for alternate workloads
or leased for cloud computing, for example. This reduction
in risk may serve to encourage more users to begin mining,
which will in turn strengthen the PoW system as a whole.
IV. ARCHITECTURE
Every execution of HashCore will consist of a sequence
of code blocks that each affect the final output in some way.
There are two types of code blocks in HashCore: a code block
that executes a cryptographic hash function such as SHA2 will
be referred to as a hash gate and a code block that executes
a workload designed to stress computational resources in an
x86 chip will be referred to as a widget. The basic HashCore
algorithm can be observed in Figure 1. Initially, the input
to HashCore will be passed through a hash gate, resulting
in a fixed-size hash output that will be used twice, once as
a random seed (which we will henceforth refer to as the
hash seed) for generating a widget and then again as part
of the input to the final hash gate. The widget generated will,
throughout execution, produce an output of variable size that is
concatenated with the hash seed and passed through a second
hash gate to achieve the final result.
Hash gates are used here to provide a simple mechanism
through which HashCore can achieve the required crypto-
graphic properties of pre-image resistance, second pre-image
resistance, and collision resistance. We provide a formal proof
of collision resistance in section V-A, which leverages the fact
Fig. 1. HashCore block diagram. The input is passed from left to right through a sequence of hash gates and widgets before the final output is realized.
Each hash gate or widget will update the value it receives as input before passing it along to the next block. Propagation of data is denoted by solid arrows,
concatenation of the Widget output and hash seed is denoted by the triangle, and the widget generation mechanism is denoted by a dashed arrow.
that the hash seed makes up part of the input to the second hash
gate, allowing us to achieve collision-resistance regardless of
the widget output. Additionally, so long as the hash gate is
pre-image resistant, it will be nearly impossible “select” a
particular widget instantiation by constructing an input that
targets a desired hash seed. Hash gates are also convenient
for their ability to map a variable length input to a fixed
length output; in our implementation we assume each hash
gate produces a 256-bit output, though this is not required.
Note that although we only make use of only a single widget in
HashCore, it is certainly possible that multiple widgets could
be generated for a given input string and executed sequentially.
A. Widget Requirements
Widgets represent the main computational task within each
execution of HashCore. At a high level, widgets must be short
x86 programs that can be run most optimally on an x86 chip.
Later we will describe how we achieve this property, but first
we must introduce formal requirements for widgets that can
be executed by HashCore:
• x86 Chip Utilization: Each set of widgets must heavily
utilize an x86 chip in such a way that, on average, no
other chip architecture will materially outperform the
most efficient x86 chip. The main structures we are tar-
geting most notably include the pipeline, branch predictor
and re-order buffer, floating point units, arithmetic logic
units, data and instruction caches, off-chip memory units,
vector processing units, and the full x86 ISA. As we will
describe in the next section, we intend to target these
structures through inverted benchmarking.
• Code Randomization: Thus far, we have only discussed
x86 chip utilization, but it is important to recognize that
for any fixed program, custom hardware can be built
that will materially outperform general purpose hardware.
This makes sense intuitively because, while general pur-
pose machines must include functionality to perform well
on a broad class of user programs, a custom machine can
be precisely engineered to a particular program. SPEC
CPU 2017 workloads are somewhat robust against this
problem because they are long enough that attempting
to hand-engineer custom hardware for them is infeasible.
Unfortunately, each execution of HashCore should have
running time on the order of a few seconds or less in
order to accommodate sub-minute block times like those
of Ethereum [14], meaning we must solve this problem in
another way. By randomizing the widgets to be executed
for each distinct input to HashCore, we ensure that no
ASIC can optimize for a particular code path.
Randomization could be achieved in two ways within our
framework. We could either fix a large set of widgets for
HashCore and select an ordered subset of them based
on the output of the first hash gate, or we could use
the output of the first hash gate as a random seed to
generate a widget or set of widgets at run-time. We opt for
the latter option, which provides the additional property
that the machine running HashCore must be able to run
the widget generation script. This does not limit general
purpose machines, which can easily accomplish such a
task, but may make designing specialized hardware more
challenging.
• Irreducible Widgets: The widget should also be irre-
ducible in the sense that certain code segments cannot be
skipped and the output cannot be predicted without full
execution of the widget. If a widget could be reduced
to an easier piece of code with minimal effort, then the
benefits of HashCore would be lost. In that event, any
individual access to the reduction algorithm would be
able to gain an unfair advantage over the rest of the
mining pool. Worse, the x86 optimal nature of HashCore
would likely be lost if a widget could be reduced to
simpler code. For these reasons, it is critical that a widget
be is not reducible to a simpler program in polynomial
time.
B. Widget Generation
Widgets are generated at run-time through the inverted
benchmarking technique. Inverted benchmarking consists of
generating widgets to match the execution profile of an exist-
ing CPU benchmark, such as SPEC CPU 2017 [12], such that
the resulting widgets run optimally on a GPP.
The inverted benchmarking technique builds on previous
research in the area of proxy generation [8]. The goal of
proxies is to generate short running programs that mimic
the behavior of much longer programs. Computer architects
use these proxies to test new computer designs on simulators
that run at much slower speeds than silicon hardware. A key
requirement is that the proxy must stress a design almost
identically to how the original program would have.
Proxies overlap well with HashCore’s requirements after a
few minor adjustments. Proxies heavily require matching per-
formance of the original workload, while HashCore requires
a large variety of pseudo-random workloads. For this reason,
HashCore modifies an existing proxy technique, PerfProx [8],
to achieve these goals.
Before discussing the modifications further, we need to
first understand the basic details of Perfprox [8]. Perfprox
functions by profiling a selected workload on a variety of
performance metrics such as instruction mix, branch behavior,
memory access patterns, and data dependencies. Using this
performance profile, Perfprox then creates a synthetic work-
load that has nearly identical performance metrics. Please refer
to [8] for a more detailed discussion. This framework provides
an adequate foundation of producing varied x86 programs.
HashCore modifies the Perfprox technique in two key ways.
First, the random seed must be added to the performance
profile as an input. The seed is distributed among various
performance metrics as outlined in Table I. The 256-bit seed
is divided into eight 32-bit integers that are added to the
performance profile. The exception to this are the last two
32-bit values which are used to seed pseudo-random number
generators. This means that each seed will add some amount of
noise to the widget generator so that each widget has slightly
different performance, resulting in a distribution of widgets
centered around the target performance profile. While this
added noise would be unacceptable for a proxy, it is neces-
sary for HashCore in order to fulfill the code randomization
requirement discussed above.
TABLE I
HASH SEED USAGE
Hash Bits Usage
0-31 Integer ALU
32-63 Integer Multiply
64-95 Floating Point ALU
96-127 Loads
128-159 Stores
160-191 Branch Behavior
192-223 Basic Block Vector Seed
224-255 Memory Seed
Second, HashCore modifies the proxies generated so that
they produce an output. There is no need for traditional proxies
to produce an output, but HashCore requires that each widget
produce a unique signature dependent on the complete execu-
tion of the widget. This problem is easily solved by forcing the
proxy to output register values throughout execution, resulting
in an output string composed of the sequence of register states
at various points in execution. This forces the entire workload
to be executed because every x86 instruction modifies the
registers in some way, and if even a single bit is incorrect
in the proxy output then the resulting hash will be invalid.
Another property of utilizing the Perfprox technique is
the additional execution requirements it places on HashCore.
Three programs must be run to produce the widget’s output.
Perfprox first runs a python script that takes the performance
profile and hash seed as an input and produces a C program.
Next, the GCC compiler compiles the C program into an
executable x86 program. Finally, the x86 program itself must
be run and the output recorded. This widget generation process
is not limiting for a typical x86 system, though it may increase
the difficulty of developing custom hardware for HashCore,
depending on the approach.
V. RESULTS
This section covers a proof of collision-resistance and some
initial experiments done on HashCore to demonstrate its utility.
We first show that, assuming the hash gates used in our
architecture are collision-resistance, we can achieve collision-
resistance on HashCore regardless of the functionality of the
widget generation and execution procedures. This is a required
result for any PoW function, as any collisions found could
threaten the tamper-resistance of the underlying blockchain
being secured. Next we analyze the performance metrics of
the widgets to show that similar performance values are
produced in comparison to the original workload. Ideally, a
set of widgets should produce a spread of performance values
centered around the original workload’s value.
All experiments were done on a set of one thousand widgets
generated on a state-of-the-art platform, a Dell PowerEdge
R320 server equipped Xeon E5-2430 v2 processor (codenamed
Ivy Bridge), and 64 GB DDR3 memory. Each single-threaded
widget was run on a single core of this system with minimal
overhead from the operating system due to core isolation. For
these experiments, we profiled a single workload from the
SPEC CPU 2017 benchmark suite, namely the Leela integer
speed workload. However, there is nothing unique about this
workload, and similar widgets could be produced for a variety
of workload performance profiles.
The widgets under test were produced by randomly gen-
erating one thousand hash seeds and combining those seeds
with the Leela performance profile in the manner described
above. These widgets produced outputs ranging in size from
20 kilobytes to 38 kilobytes with a large amount of variation in
register contents during execution. In more detail, the output
is a series of snapshots of the computer’s register contents
captured every few thousand instructions. These instructions
sequentially modify the register state, which leads to a de-
pendency both on the initial register state and the instructions
executed.
A. Proof of Collision-Resistance
In this section we describe our proof of the collision-
resistance of HashCore under the assumption that the hash
gates being used are collision-resistant. More concretely, we
will prove Theorem 1 using a fairly straightforward reduction,
a proof technique that involves reducing the security guarantee
of a system to that of a primitive within the system. First, we
will describe some of the definitions used in the proof at a
high level, though for more complete definitions we refer the
reader to [4].
A probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) attacker is one who
has the ability generate truly random bits and is allowed to
make a polynomial (in some security parameter specific to
the security scheme in question) number of queries. In this
paper, one query is a single execution of HashCore. Requiring
the adversary to be computationally bounded is crucial to our
analysis, as collisions exist by definition in any compressing
hash function, and an unbounded adversary could simply
enumerate every input-output pair and find a collision with
at least the same advantage. A function f(x) is said to be
negligible if it grows slower than any 1xc for any constant
c. Finally, a Collision-Resistant Hash Function (CRHF) is a
hash function with the following security property: given a
full description of the function, any PPT adversary can find a
collision with at most negligible probability. Put another way,
it should be so improbable that any PPT adversary can find a
collision on a CRHF that it will essentially never happen. In
this work, we make the fairly standard assumption that SHA-
256, the hash function we use in our hash gates, is a CRHF.
Let G : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a CRHF, W : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}l be a function that maps n bits to l bits, and H :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a function that uses G and W as
intermediate steps to compute its end result. Specifically, for
an input x, let s = G(x) be the hash seed generated from the
first hash gate. Then H(x) = G(s||W (s)) fully defines the
function of HashCore, where || denotes the concatenation of
two bit-strings, G denotes a single hash gate, and W denotes
the complete widget generation and execution process.
Theorem 1 (Collision-Resistance of HashCore). H is a CRHF
if G is a CRHF.
We will provide an informal overview of the proof of
Theorem 1 here; for a more formal proof we direct the reader
to the appendix. Intuitively, the proof proceeds in the following
way. We first assume that H is not a CRHF, meaning there
exists a PPT adversary that is able to find a collision on
HashCore. We then show that if such an adversary exists, we
can use this adversary to find a collision on G with probability
1, as any collision on H will require a collision on either the
first or second execution of G. This leads to a contradiction,
however, as we have assumed G to be a CRHF. It follows that
if G is a CRHF, then H must also be a CRHF.
We also remark that although we denote the output of W
to be an l-bit string in the proof for ease of understanding,
W actually has variable-length output in our implementation
of HashCore. This does not affect the validity of the proof,
as all of the analysis performed is agnostic to the output size
of W ; in fact, the result holds regardless of any property of
W so long as W can be executed in polynomial time2. This
2In order to avoid instantiations of W that simply brute force search for a
collision on G, for example.
Fig. 2. IPC Widget Comparison
Fig. 3. Branch Prediction Widget Comparison
allows us to achieve collision-resistance essentially for free,
strengthening the HashCore framework for future work.
B. Performance Experiments
This section outlines our analysis of the widgets with respect
to how they matched the Leela workload performance values.
While not a strict requirement for HashCore, the widgets
should have similar performance characteristics to Leela in
order to apply the inverted benchmarking idea to a CPU. With
this in mind, we measured various performance metrics for the
thousand sample widgets and compared them to the original
workload.
The performance results are outlined in Figure V-B. As can
be seen for IPC, the widgets seem to follow a roughly Gaussian
distribution with a mean slightly lower than those of the origi-
nal Leela workload. Such a shift in performance is acceptable
for our purposes and helps highlight the noise being added by
the hash seed. Importantly, HashCore only adds positive noise
to the instruction type counts. This increase in instructions
leads to proportionally less branch instructions which are often
a limiting factor to performance. The branch behavior further
solidifies these results as shown in Figure V-B. These results
are expected given how the widget generator was designed.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Widget Generation vs Selection
In this work we generate widgets randomly at runtime
to achieve sufficiently random code, though we believe that
storing a fixed set of widgets instead could be a viable
alternative. This kind of solution would likely require a very
large widget pool, perhaps consisting of as many total lines
of code as SPEC CPU 2017 or more, in order to discourage
chip designers from engineering ASICs specifically for each
widget. Then each execution of the PoW function would
consist of gating the input string and using the result to select
some ordered set of these widgets to be executed, resulting in
an output string to be hashed.
While random generation and random selection seem sim-
ilar on the surface, there are several important tradeoffs to
consider. In terms of storage, random generation likely wins
out, as the widget pool used for selection could consist of
several gigabytes worth of code depending on the implemen-
tation. Selection also comes with the risk that custom ASICs
could be constructed for some subset of the widget pool,
resulting in modest performance gains any time these widgets
are selected. On the other hand, widget selection is far less
computationally intensive than widget generation no matter
how efficient the generator script is. This would mean that
widget execution would account for a higher percentage of the
total execution time of the PoW function, which in turn could
mean greater utilization of the GPP in question. Additionally,
targeting and analyzing the resource utilization of the class of
widgets produced by a generator script may be more difficult
than it would be for a pre-determined pool of widgets. We
believe it is possible that some combination of both approaches
could yield a robust PoW function, though we leave this to
future work.
B. Targeting alternative GPPs
Although we target x86 ICs in this work, there is no reason
that the HashCore framework could not be leveraged on a
variety of other chip architectures, such as ARM cores or
GPUs. We target x86 chips because most would-be miners
already own x86 chips in their personal computers and most
personal computers can easily run mining software, though it
would be interesting to consider constructing a PoW function
optimized for the ARM cores in mobile phones, for example.
We have intentionally made HashCore fully modular, so modi-
fying HashCore to target alternate architectures would require
only that a new widget pool or widget generator script be
developed.
C. Alternatives to Inverted Benchmarking
Our motivation for using inverted benchmarking, which for
HashCore simply involves constructing widgets that mimic
the execution pattern of SPEC CPU 2017, is based on the
assumption that all x86 ICs are ASICs for SPEC CPU 2017.
We seek to leverage the research and development performed
by x86 architects in our widget design. However, alternate
strategies exist, such as that of RandomX [13]. The developers
of RandomX approach the problem from a different angle
by constructing a virtual machine that attempts to simulate
a generic GPP. Their strategy involves generating a random
program to fit into the VM they define before executing it,
followed by a hash on the output. This differs from HashCore
only in the program generation methodology, where we target
a particular execution profile matching SPEC CPU 2017 and
they instead target explicit utilization of each computational
structure. It could be that some combination of these two
approaches would be effective, though we also leave this for
future work to determine.
D. Repurposing Mining Hardware
In addition to reducing the pricing and availability barriers
against entering the mining market, targeting GPPs as ASICs
for a PoW function comes with an additional benefit when we
consider that the revenue available in mining markets varies
over time. One problem we see with mining today is that
ASICs for current PoW functions have little use outside of
mining. By constructing a PoW function that can be efficiently
mined with a GPP, we allow mining hardware to be repurposed
as needed. It may be profitable in some mining markets
for users to mine with their personal computer over night,
for example. More importantly, as fluctuations in transaction
volume or market capitalization affect the profitability of
mining a cryptocurrency over time, large-scale miners often
must decrease the amount of hashing power they contribute
to a PoW system in order to maximize profits. In the absence
of alternative mining markets, these machines could easily be
repurposed for a time as cloud compute servers, for example.
Because GPPs have value outside of mining, we can reduce
some of the risks associated with purchasing and owning
mining hardware, further reducing the barriers to entering the
mining market.
E. Additional Benefits of a Modular PoW Function
Another interesting consideration is that the HashCore
framework is agnostic to the code executed by each widget
so long as it meets the requirements detailed in Section IV.
One of the most common criticisms of PoW systems today
is that, because the search for suitable nonces has no external
benefits, mining appears to be a waste of energy. This is not so,
as energy is being expended to guarantee immutability of the
blockchain to some degree. Still, it is worth considering that
philanthropic or otherwise useful workloads could be injected
as widgets into the HashCore framework to improve public
perception and provide non-economic incentives to potential
miners. For example, there may be a way that tasks that
require high computational effort, such as protein folding [5]
or searching for extraterrestrial life [11], could be baked into
the widgets used in a PoW function. It is worth noting that
this has the potential to degrade the security guarantees of
a PoW system by providing malicious actors with additional
incentives to attack. We do not believe this will be the case,
as the additional incentives are shared by both honest and
malicious miners, but we leave this security analysis again to
future work.
F. Future Work
While we believe that HashCore is a step in the right
direction towards a completely decentralized mining market,
there are still a few open questions that must be worked out
before HashCore can be viable in a real PoW system. Most
notably, obtaining provable guarantees that a set of workloads
are most efficiently run on a particular chip design is an open
question for computer architects. Instead, we currently rely
on a heuristic argument that an x86 IC is a near-optimal
ASIC for SPEC CPU 2017 and that HashCore mimics SPEC
CPU 2017 in execution pattern. At a higher level, we also
observe that HashCore alone will not guarantee a decentralized
mining market in the long term. At a competitive equilibrium,
economies of scale and access to cheap energy will likely
result in a relatively small number of large mining operations
located wherever the cheapest electricity can be purchased.
Even so, HashCore will still reduce entry barriers before a
competitive equilibrium is reached and allow for hardware
repurposing and the potential for philanthropic workloads at
market equilibrium.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The primary motivation for developing HashCore is to
promote a more accessible and competitive mining market for
cryptocurrencies utilizing a Proof-of-Work protocol to achieve
blockchain consensus. To this end, we have identified an ASIC
that many would-be miners already own, an x86 CPU, and
have developed a PoW function to match this ASIC. HashCore
consists of a pseudo-randomly generated x86 program called a
widget that must be executed in its entirety in order to achieve
a valid result. By generating widgets that mimic the execution
profile of SPEC CPU 2017, a workload for which x86 chips
can be thought of as ASICs, we are able to take advantage
of the research and development performed by x86 chip
developers. This work represents an inversion of the problems
faced by both x86 chip developers and ASIC developers, as
both of these groups seek to optimize hardware against a
fixed workload while we seek to optimize a workload against
fixed hardware. We believe that this approach will reduce
the barriers for users to profitably mine cryptocurrencies and
facilitate less centralized mining markets.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF COLLISION-RESISTANCE OF HASHCORE
For readability, we repeat the definitions from Section V
here.
Let G : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a CRHF, W : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}l be a function that maps n bits to l bits, and H :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a function that uses G and W as
intermediate steps to compute its end result. Specifically, for
an input x, let s = G(x) be the hash seed generated from the
first hash gate. Then H(x) = G(s||W (s)), where || denotes
the concatenation of two bit-strings, fully defines HashCore.
Theorem 1 (Collision-Resistance of HashCore). H is a CRHF
if G is a CRHF.
Proof. Assume that there exists a PPT adversary A that can
find x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that x0 6= x1 and H(x0) = H(x1)
with non-negligible advantage, defined as advA = Pr[A finds
a collision on H]. We will construct a PPT algorithm B that
uses A to break the CRHF security of G. B is defined below.
1) B receives the function G from the CRHF challenger
and constructs H . B sends a full description of H to A.
2) Next, B receives xˆ0, xˆ1 from A as an attempt at a
collision on H . B constructs x∗0, x∗1 in the following way.
• If H(xˆ0) = H(xˆ1) and xˆ0 6= xˆ1, compute s0 =
G(xˆ0), s1 = G(xˆ1).
– If s0 = s1, set x∗0 = xˆ0, x∗1 = xˆ1.
– Else, set x∗0 = s0||W (s0), x∗1 = s1||W (s1).
• Else, B selects x∗0, x∗1 at random.
Clearly, A wins if H(xˆ0) = H(xˆ1) and B wins if
G(x∗0) = G(x
∗
1).
Next, we will argue that if A finds a collision on H , then
B is guaranteed to produce a collision on G with the above
algorithm. In other words, given xˆ0 6= xˆ1 such that H(xˆ0) =
H(xˆ1), B can find x∗0 6= x∗1 such that G(x∗0) = G(x∗1). We
will argue this case by case.
Case 1: s0 = s1.
Clearly in this case, x∗0 = xˆ0, x
∗
1 = xˆ1 is a collision on G,
as s0 = G(xˆ0), s1 = G(xˆ1).
Case 2: s0 6= s1.
In this case, we know that s0||W (s0) 6= s1||W (s1) and that
G(s0||W (s0)) = G(s1||W (s1)). Then x∗0 = s0||W (s0), x∗1 =
s1||W (s1) is a collision on G.
It is then clear that advB = Pr[B finds a collision on G]
≥ Pr[A finds a collision on H] = advA. This leads to a
contradiction, as we have assumed that G is a CRHF. The
statement follows.
